Although the movement of the established countries is different from that of the OPMs, these countries were also concerned about the effects of tobacco companies refusing to join the MSA. Settler countries feared that NPMs would be able to regulate their sales in order to stay financially afloat while being effective. On the basis of these two concerns, THE OPMs and the implementing countries wanted the MSAs to encourage these other tobacco companies to join the agreement. A separate comparison, called Smokeless Tobacco MSA (STMSA), terminated the states` claims against the U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Company (USSTC). Marketing and advertising restrictions within the STMSA in parallel with the MSA, although the agreement does not require usstc to pay compensation to the states. In the ten years since the agreement, many national and local governments have opted to sell so-called tobacco bonds. It`s a form of securitization. In many cases, bonds allow national and local governments to transfer the risk of a reduction in future agreements to bondholders.
However, in some cases, obligations are supported by secondary commitments of government or local revenue, prompting some to view it as a perverse incentive to support the tobacco industry, on which they now depend for future payments of that debt.  This summary of the Act summarizes the restrictions imposed by the MSA on the marketing and advertising of tobacco products, as well as behaviours that the MSA does not affect. It also provides a step-by-step description of the implementation process, ranging from informal investigations to litigation, examines several enforcement actions that have helped to realize the importance of some of the marketing and advertising restrictions imposed by the MSA, and identifies other areas of industry behaviour that pose current and likely challenges in the future for the implementation of ASMs. The fact that pre-MSA trading discussions were widely known implies that MSA was not entirely unexpected to investors. To the extent that the payment was expected by investors prior to November 1998, these expectations would be expected to be reflected in the prices of the equity offers of these companies. In fact, the share price of these companies increased on the day of the arrival of MSA, 10 On November 23, 1998, Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, Lorillard (Loews Unit) and Brown-Williamson (a U.S. subsidiary of British American Tobacco) and 46 Attorneys General signed a $206 billion agreement. 1 Four states were not part of the MSA and settled separately with the tobacco companies prior to the agreement. A fifth company, Liggett (a unit of Vector Group), has finally signed with MSA. If MSA`s payments had been imposed as an unexpected lump sum fine and not as a payment per unit of domestic sales, the payments would have been borne by the owners of the companies. In its structure, the MSA has authorized the deferral of payments in the form of significant price increases.
Although the structuring of the penalty as a lump sum obligation would have weighed on the owners of the businesses if the Attorneys General had not accepted the unit payment, the transaction negotiations could be stalled, with additional procedural costs for both parties to the dispute and with the additional possibility that the states lost in court. The decline in total domestic cigarette consumption is a success for MSA.24 domestic cigarette units decreased, but the decline was stronger in 1999. While the MSA may have helped to ensure the financial viability of major U.S. tobacco producers by increasing their profitability, thereby reducing cigarette consumption, the increase in the price of cigarettes in itself has significant public health benefits.